The Situation 1940-1941. The United States had a large Pacific market for American import and export goods which it intended to maintain, by armed force if necessary. In China, for example, the United States and Great Britain accounted for 73% of China's imports from and 88% of China's exports to Western nations (figures are for the year 1940, McDannald, 1941, 128). Similarly, forty-two percent of French Indochina's rubber export went to the United States (Ibid., 288). In the words of Joseph Grew, U. S. Ambassador to Japan, "My government has an interest in the commerce and economic development of Far Eastern countries just as his Japan (Unknown, n.d., 84)."

        The Roosevelt administration rightfully felt America's economic interests in the western Pacific region threatened by the Sino-Japanese conflict and, later, by Japanese troop movements in Indochina. And in September 1940 Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles laid out the "primary requirements of the United States in the Far East" as follows: "Complete respect by all powers for the legitimate rights of the United States and of its nationals ... ; equality of opportunity for the trade of all nations; and, finally, respect for the international agreements or treaties concerning the Far East to which the United States is a party (Unknown, n.d., 113)."

        In sharp contrast to Washington's desire to protect the status quo, Tokyo envisioned "a new order" in Greater East Asia. Japan actively sought to unite the peoples of the Far East, assume its "proper place" as leader of this union, and establish "a just and permanent peace (Unknown, n.d., 93)." The Tokyo government began enforcing with its military forces an Asiatic version of the Monroe Doctrine (Times, 10 July 1940, 7). Its fundamental guiding principle throughout was that "peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally, and economically should first form a sphere of their own for co-existence and co-prosperity (Unknown, n.d., 93)." Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs reflected the intensity of Japan's pursuit when he remarked, "... we have not hesitited at times even to fight [thereby] staking our national existence (Ibid.)."

        The events. Throughout the Sino-Japanese War the United States recognized the Chiang Kai-shek government as the legitimate government in China and, quite naturally, viewed Japan's aggressions with horror. Towards the end of the 1930's and continuing into the 1940's the United States government restricted American business exports to Japan. Beginning in 1938 it restricted airplanes and airplane parts going to Japan. Later restrictions were also placed on aviation gasoline (July 1940), iron and steel scraps (September 1940), and, then, all iron and steel (December 1940).

        Meanwhile, with the backing of Tokyo, Wang Jingwei set up his own government in China to rival that of Chiang Kai-shek. One of the new government's first actions was to sign a treaty with Japan which sanctioned the presence of Japanese forces in China (Unknown, n.d., 117). Thus Japan had established a cover, shallow as it may have been, for the continued occupation of China.

        In [July] 1941 the Roosevelt administration froze Japanese assets in the United States [and cut off oil]. Almost simultaneously Japan began making large troop movements in French Indochina. When President Roosevelt demanded of the Japanese government an explanation for the vast amount of troops pouring into Indochina, he placed Japan in the position of withdrawal or war (Times, 3 Dec 1941, 1 and Ibid., 7 Dec 1941, 1). Within a week they attacked Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Northern Malaya, and Singapore (Ibid., 8 Dec 1941, 1). The war had started.

        The alternatives. From about 1938 on, it was quite clear that the delicate balance Washington was attempting to maintain would fail. The exportation of U.S. oil to Japan had delayed war for two years (Unknown, n.d., 265 and Acheson, 1969, 25). Yet to continue such a policy indefinitely, the United States would have had to watch Japan push the western powers out of East Asia. This the Roosevelt administration could not allow. In the words of the President, "... we had to get a lot of things--rubber--tin--and so forth and so on--down in the Dutch [East] Indies, the Straits Settlements, and Indochina (Unknown, n.d., 264)."

        With such a conflict of interests between Japan and the United States only two solutions were available. The United States would have to abandon its Asian interests or else Japan would have to relinquish its plans for a united East Asia. Since neither party was willing to yield unless forced to do so, the outbreak of war was inevitable.

        Any comments on this article will be welcomed and should be mailed to the author at Aichi Gakuin University, General Education Division, 12 Araike, Iwasaki-cho, Nisshin, Japan 470-0195 or e-mailed to him. Other papers and works in progress may be accessed at http:// www3.aichi-gakuin.ac.jp/ ~jeffreyb/ research/ index.html .

Acheson, Dean (1969). Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: Norton.

McDannald, A. H. (Ed.). The Americana 1941 Annual. New York: Americana Corp.

New York Times. 10 July 1940.
New York Times. 3 December 1941.
New York Times. 7 December 1941.
New York Times. 8 December 1941.