The Russian-Polish Border. Between the two great nations of Germany and Russia lies Poland. It has no natural frontiers, only flat plains. For this very reason it has often been used as a corridor of attack against its Russian neighbor. Invaders have attacked, divided, and occupied Poland numerous times. This in turn has tended to blend the ethnic groups along the already ill defined Polish boundaries.
        In March 1921 Russia and Poland signed the Treaty of Riga which established the eastern boundary of Poland somewhat east of the Curzon Line (the previously determined boundary). But in August 1939 the Soviets signed a treaty with Nazi Germany agreeing to a new partition of Poland. Two days later London and Warsaw, in response to the German threat, announced a mutual defense treaty.
        On September 1 Hitler's troops moved into Poland to claim their share of Poland as agreed to by Moscow. Within a couple of days England, in accord with the terms of its recent treaty with the Poles, declared war upon Germany. About two weeks later Russia invaded Poland while claiming to protect the eastern Poles from German aggression. The Second World War was on and once again Poland found itself partitioned and occupied by foreign troops.

        Allied Interests in Poland. The Soviet Union borders Poland. And, as mentioned earlier, had frequently been attacked from across the Polish frontier. World War II was no exception to this rule when in June 1941 Germany attacked her Russian ally (McDannald, 1942, 593). Poland was a vital element in consideration of Russia's national security and would continue to be a vital element in the future. In addition to Moscow's strategic interest in Poland, there was consideration of the Russian ethnic groups on the Polish side of the border. These two factors contributed to the formation of strong Russian interests in the future of Poland and its people.
        Great Britain's interest in Poland sprang from its obligations under their mutual defense treaty. The mutual defense treaty, in turn, came about from a decision that England preferred to make her stance against Hitler in east Europe, rather than on the English channel. Now London was honor-bound on the basis of that treaty to look out for the Poles. The Polish question was clearly subordinate to Great Britain's own problems at home and throughout the British Empire.
        Seven million Polish-Americans provided impetus for the United States government's concern over Poland. Just emerging from its policy of isolation, the United States had no significant practical interests in eastern Europe, only heart-felt sympathies of the Polish-American community.
        By far, Russian concern for the future of Poland arose from factors more immediate, substantive, and practical than those of the western Allies. [At the war's end Russian troops were on the ground with American and British troops still far away.] As a result Moscow was in a position to take much higher risks in bargaining with the Allies over conquered territories.

        The Polish Government-in-Exile. The Polish government-in-exile demanded of Moscow more than either Britain or the United States were willing to demand. [Its] interest in Poland was, of course, supreme. [Its members] would have to live and work under the terms of any settlement once they returned home. The continuing experiences of the Poles dispelled any illusions their government might have had about the friendly intentions of the Soviets.
        In September 1939 Russia had invaded Poland. Subsequently the conquerors began a massive deportation of all "anti-Soviet elements" in Poland, including many Polish Army officers (see Rozek, 1958, 448-451 for Dr. Wladyslaw's eye-witness account). Later, when the mass murder of [Polish officers] at Katyn was revealed, the Polish government had reason to suspect [that the Russians had killed them]. Furthermore, the Soviet Union declared many Poles, against their will, to be Soviet citizens. The circumstances surrounding the Warsaw uprising and the betrayal of leaders of the Polish resistance forces added fuel for a Polish-Russian feud.
        Yet, while the Polish government-in-exile was prepared to do some hard bargaining with Moscow, they required the strength of the western Allies to back-up their demands. This they never got. On July 15, 1941, during the time of Russia's greatest military weakness, Britain's Foreign Minister Anthony Eden forced Poland's Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski to accept vague boundary conditions in a treaty with Russia. Three Polish Cabinet members: Mr. Zaleski, Dr. Seyda, and General Sosnkowski resigned in protest. Prior to the Teheran Conference both Roosevelt and Churchill refused Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's request to see them concerning the Polish question. [Prime Minister Sikorski had died in a plane crash.] Both men feared Stalin would take offense.

        British and American Bargaining Positions. Britain, the oldest member of the Allied forces, was heavily taxed by their lengthy struggle in the war. During 1941 and into 1942 London viewed Russian support in the war against Germany as being absolutely necessary for England's survival. In the later years of the war, after a huge drain on England's resources and population, the British government would rather make compromises in eastern Europe than risk involvement in another international conflict.
        The United States, which had the least real interest in Poland, had the most to gain from friendly relations with Moscow. When the war in Europe ended it would still be at war in the Pacific with Japan. As John Hickerson, deputy director of the Office of European Affairs, stated it: "We sorely need the Soviet Union in the war against Japan when the war in Europe is over (quoting from U.S. State Department, 1955 reprinted in Delzell, 1956, 100)." A second consideration in Soviet-American relations was the development of the United Nations, which Washington was quite anxious to have the Soviet Union support.
        Thus Russia had a very favorable bargaining position. And while she became more and more arrogant, the United States and Great Britain remained concilitory, trying to procure Soviet cooperation.
        The Russian attitude is perhaps best expressed in the words of a Russian acquaintance of George Kennan who [in July 1944] said:

"The more successful we are, the less we care about foreign opinion. This is something you should bear in mind about the Russian. The better things go for him, the more arrogant he is. That applies to all of us, in the government and out of it. It is only when we have hard sledding that we are meek and mild and conciliatory. When we are successful, keep out of our way (Kennan, 1967,197)."

As long as Russia was in a good position militarily or diplomatically it would press its advantage. The only good time to bargain with the Soviet Union would be when it needed support. During the early party of its war with Germany, the Soviet Union was in a dangerous military position. The Germans advanced rapidly into Russian territory. This would have been the optimal time to force Moscow into concessions favorable to the western Allies and the Polish government-in-exile.
        It is interesting to note that in the summer of 1941, at a time when Germany was defeating the Soviets, Great Britain was able to pressure Moscow into recognizing the Polish government-in-exile, granting amnesty to incarcerated Poles, and permitting the formation of a Polish Army on Soviet soil. Later, as Russia recovered from the German attacks and developed a strong military position, she was able to make demands with only minor concessions. She was on her way to becoming a great world power.

        Conclusion. The Polish question was not so much a territorial question as a question of government: Who shall rule Poland? For the maintenance of Russian national security it was important that the Polish government be friendly towards the Soviet Union and that it be strong militarily. With much less urgency Moscow also wished to annex eastern Poland, with its Russian ethnic groups, into the Soviet Union.
        The United States and great Britain might have been able to save Poland from Russian domination if they had been less hesitant in their support of the Polish government-in-exile's demands. In July 1941 Britain's Foreign Minister Eden should have settled the Polish boundaries in his negotiations for a Polish-Russian treaty. Once Stalin's military position improved, the western Allies would have to whole-heartedly defend the terms of that treaty, pitting their combined might against the increasingly victorious Russians. Such a policy would have its risks, but it is the only policy that might have dampened the snowballing of Soviet arrogance.

        Any comments on this article will be welcomed and should be mailed to the author at Aichi Gakuin University, General Education Division, 12 Araike, Iwasaki-cho, Nisshin, Japan 470-0195 or e-mailed to him. Other papers and works in progress may be accessed at http:// www3.aichi-gakuin.ac.jp/ ~jeffreyb/ research/ index.html .

Feis, Herbert (1957). Churchill--Roosevelt--Stalin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kennan, George (1967). Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

McDannald, A. H. (Ed.). The Americana 1942 Annual. New York: Americana Corp.

Rozek, Edward (1958). Allied Wartime Diplomacy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.